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Symposium 
The Rehnquist Court in Empirical and 
Statistical Retrospective 
WARREN COURT PRECEDENTS IN THE 
REHNQUIST COURT 
Frank B. Cross* 
Thomas A. Smith** 
Antonio Tomarchio*** 
This research empirically examines the use of particular 
Warren Court decisions as precedents in the Rehnquist Court. 
Analysis of precedent citation is not widely used but offers in-
sight into judicial decisionmaking and the materiality of the 
Court's rulings. Our prior research has shown that the Rehnquist 
Court's citation practices appeared to reduce the coherence of 
the Supreme Court's network of precedents. 1 In this article we 
take a finer grained look at the Court's use of various Warren 
Court opinions. 
We begin by analyzing the quantitative study of precedent 
citation as an analytical measure. Although the tool has some 
limitations, there is ample reason to believe that it can provide 
important insights into judicial decisions. Our analysis includes a 
sample of Warren Court decisions and examines their compara-
tive citation patterns in the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist 
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20011), availahle at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909217 [hereinafter Reagan Revolution]: 
Frank B. Cross et al., Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme Court's Network of 
Precedents (Aug. 20011) (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-67. U of Texas Law. Law 
& Econ Research Paper No. 90.).availahle at http://ssrn.com/abstract=924110. 
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Courts. We then apply a model that allows for the aging of 
precedents and find that the Rehnquist Court has significantly 
reduced the vitality of, or depreciated the capital of the Warren 
Court opinions that we studied. This effect was not a uniform 
one, and the magnitude of the depreciation varied according to 
which Warren Court Justice authored the opinion to be cited as 
precedent. 
I. PRECEDENT AS A TOOL OF ANALYSIS 
The study of use of precedent offers a valuable tool for ana-
lyzing judicial decisionmaking. Traditionally, quantitative em-
pirical analysis of the courts has focused only on the apparent 
binary ideological outcome of the decision (liberal or conserva-
tive), without respect to the content of the opinion or any other 
scale for the decision that could capture its nature. 2 Yet it is the 
content of the opinion that is significant, especially for Supreme 
Court decisions. The outcome of such a decision affects only the 
parties, but the opinion can influence hundreds or thousands of 
future cases brought on similar facts. While one might assume 
that a liberal outcome would set a liberal precedent, this is not 
necessarily the case, and the binary outcome coding cannot 
measure whether a particular opinion is moderately liberal (or 
conservative) or more extremely ideological.3 The quantitative 
study of precedent can provide some insight into the content of 
opinions, as precedents are to some degree the "currency" of the 
judicial opinion. "[T]he judiciary's most important policy output 
[is] the precedents set by court opinions."4 However, the mean-
ing of a precedent over time is not constant but is an "iterative 
process" in which the Court applies and modifies its meaning.5 
2. But see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Analysis. 19 J .L. & ECON. 249 ( 1976) (examining the rate of citation 
over time. which the authors called depreciation of a precedent). 
3. See Reagan Revolution. supra note 1. at 7 (noting that "[a] decision might be 
liberal in the sense that it ruled for the [more]liberal party to the action but its content 
much less liberal than another hypothetical liberal decision in the same case or even than 
the presumed state of the existing law at the time of the decision"). 
4. James F. Spriggs. II & Thomas G. Hansford, Measuring Legal Change: The Re-
liahility and Validity of Shepard's Citations. 53 POL. RES. Q. 327. 32X (2000). 
5. See generally Wayne Mcintosh et al.. Using Information Technology to Examine 
the Communication of Precedent: Initial Findings and Lessons from the CITE-IT Pro-
ject. (Mar. 17-19, 2005) (prepared for the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Western Political 
Science Association). availahle al http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt!CITE-IT/Documents/ 
WPSA %202005.pdf 
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The quantitative analysis of precedent has seen only limited 
use, though, perhaps because the accumulation of data is quite 
time-consuming.6 Recently, though, data have become available 
on the network of citations within the Supreme Court. 7 This data 
enables a direct study of precedent citation. Studies using this 
network data have begun to emerge. Researchers have used this 
network data to identify the most cited cases over the Court's 
historl and changes in relative importance of types of cases over 
time.9 We have examined the effect of the Rehnquist Court on 
the coherence of the overall network and the determinants of 
network cohesion. 10 The remainder of this section discusses the 
usefulness of analyzing precedent in judicial decisionmaking. 
A. LiMITATIONS OF PRECEDENT AS A TOOL OF ANALYSIS 
Before commencing our analysis of the Rehnquist Court's 
use of Warren Court precedent, it is important to add some ca-
veats on the reliance on precedent as a tool for measuring judi-
cial decisionmaking. First, precedents are used in very different 
ways. An opinion may rely directly upon a precedent and cite it 
as governing authority. In this usage, the precedent has great 
importance. Alternatively, a decision may cite a precedent only 
in passing, such as in a string citation. In this usage, the prece-
dent may carry relatively little weight in determining the deci-
sion. Simply counting of precedents does not measure this dis-
tinction. Indeed, some realists suggest that precedent simply 
serves as a mask for ideological decisionmaking and is irrelevant 
to the Court's decisions. 
In addition, precedent may be used in a negative manner 
that serves to undermine its strength. Most dramatically, the 
Court may overrule a precedent and virtually eliminate its au-
thority, though this requires a citation of the overruled opinion. 
Even absent an overruling, the Court may significantly under-
6. One seminal study of Supreme Court citation of precedent and overruling is 
THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDE:-JT ON THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006). 
7. The use of this network analysis and a description of the network used in this 
article is elaborated in Reagan Revolution. supra note 1. at 10-2R. 
8. See James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal 
Importance of Supreme Court Precedents. POL. ANALYSIS. (forthcoming 2007). availahle 
at http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu. 
9. See James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon. The Authority of Supreme Court Prece-
dent: A Network Analysis, Soc. NETWORKS (forthcoming 2007). availah/e at 
http:/ /jhfowier. ucsd.edu. 
I 0. See supra note 1. 
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mine the authority of an existing opinion. 11 A more limited nega-
tive treatment might involve the distinguishing of a precedent. In 
this usage, a Court would explain why a precedent does not gov-
ern the facts of the instant case. While such distinguishing may 
be perfectly appropriate, because the precedent was inapplicable 
to the facts, the approach may also be used to undermine the 
precedent, limiting it to its facts and narrowing its future value. 
The use of a precedent in a Court decision may also be un-
avoidable because of its obvious relevance to the case. It is rela-
tively common for the parties for both sides of a case to cite 
many of the same precedents in their briefs. This signals that the 
parties consider this precedent to be of unavoidable relevance 
for the Court. Similarly, one often finds both the majority opin-
ion and dissenting opinions citing the same precedent, which in-
dicates that its ability to govern the Court's decision was some-
what limited. Nevertheless, there remains some "decisional 
leeway in determining whether a precedent governs a case." 12 
The viability of precedent will also depend on the cases that 
come before the Court. An opinion on the dormant commerce 
clause, for example, will receive fewer citations before a Court 
that chooses to take for review fewer cases in this issue area. 
Conversely, if the Court chooses to accept for review more cases 
in a particular area of the law, precedents on that area will be 
cited more often. This limitation is not so severe, however, be-
cause of the Court's docket control. For example, a Court's deci-
sion to take certiorari on more Eleventh Amendment cases, for 
example, will be meaningful. If the failure to cite a prior prece-
dent is due to denial of certiorari on relevant applications of that 
precedent, this decision is also a meaningful one. 
Another influence on the Court's use of past precedents will 
be the simple number of cases that it accepts for review. A Court 
that decides more cases will inevitably cite past precedents more 
often. The Rehnquist Court has dramatically reduced the 
Court's caseload, at least as compared with other recent Courts. 
Consequently, one would expect it to cite fewer precedents in 
toto than did those other Courts, unless it dramatically increased 
the per-case citations in its opinions. The outcome of this effect 
II. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS. s11pra note n. at n (observing that "the Court can 
negatively interpret a precedent by restricting its reach or calling into question its con-
tinuing importance" and thus undercut its legal authority and "diminish its applicability 
to other legal disputes"). 
12. /rl. at 22. 
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will be addressed below, as it explains the use of Warren Court 
precedents in the Rehnquist Court. 
B. SURVIVING VIRTUES OF PRECEDENT AS A TOOL OF 
ANALYSIS 
Notwithstanding the limitations addressed above, the analy-
sis of precedent retains utility in the analysis of judicial deci-
sionmaking. If precedents were not meaningful, the Court would 
not ever take the trouble to overturn them. Moreover, the rela-
tive importance of such precedents is obvious from the heavy re-
liance they receive in briefs presented to the Court. 
The greatest importance of a Supreme Court precedent lies 
in the governance it provides for the future decisions of the 
Court itself and of lower courts. 13 Because lower courts decide 
many more cases than does the Supreme Court, the significance 
of a Court's opinion lies primarily in its progeny-the degree to 
which it is applied in later cases by lower courts. Ample research 
indicates that lower courts are relatively reliable interpreters of 
Supreme Court precedents. 14 
Richard Posner has argued for greater use of such empirical 
quantitative studies of citations to precedent. 15 He notes that 
"[j]udges, lawyers who brief and argue cases, and law professors 
and students ... [may] make their living" through the analysis 
and use of such precedents. 16 He argues that "rigorous quantita-
tive analysis" enables the study of "elusive but important social 
phenomena such as reputation, influence, prestige, celebrity, the 
diffusion of knowledge, the rise and decline of schools of 
thought, stare decisis," and other factors. 17 
Recent empirical analysis illustrates the relevance of the 
"vitality" of particular precedents as reflected by their citation 
13. See id. at 3 (noting that the ''legal reasoning" of an opinion "can have more far-
reaching consequences·· than the simple case outcome "by altering the existing state of 
legal policy and thus helping to structure the outcomes of future disputes"). 
14. See. e.g. Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick. Overruled. An Event History Analy-
sis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534 
(2002): Charles A. Johnson. Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal 
Court Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 L. & SOC. REV. 325 (19H7): Donald R. Songer 
et al.. The Hierarchy of Justice: Te.\'/ing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-
Cirwit Court Interactions, 3H AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994). 
15. See generally Richard A. Posner. An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations 
in the Law. 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 3H1 (2000). 
16. /d. at 3H2. 
17. /d. 
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patterns. Not all precedents "have the same bite." 18 There is 
some dispute over the determinants of precedential vitality, with 
some suggestion that a larger Court majority might strengthen 
the authority of an opinion. 19 Hansford and Spriggs examined 
the question of precedential influence and hypothesized that a 
precedent's vitality was largely the product of being cited.20 They 
found a significant association between the precedent's vitality 
(as measured by Qrior citations to the precedent) and its future 
use by the Court. 21 Perhaps more significantly, they also found 
that a positive citation to a prior precedent, giving it vitality, si~­
nificantly increased its future use by lower federal courts. 2 
There is ample evidence of the effect of Supreme Court Justices 
ideology on its decisions, 23 and the authors found that this effect 
extended to citations-coalitions of more liberal Justices were 
more likely to increase the vitality of precedents decided by 
more liberal coalitions of Justices. 
Thus, Supreme Court precedents and their citation have 
material practical importance. When the Court cites a prior 
opinion as precedent, it gives that opinion greater vitality in the 
law. Greater vitality, in turn, yields greater significance for the 
opinion for future decisions. Precedential citation choice, there-
fore, has meaning and is worthy of empirical analysis. 
II. WARREN COURT PRECEDENTS IN 
THE REHNQUIST COURT 
One might expect the relatively conservative Rehnquist 
Court to make limited use of the relatively liberal Warren Court 
precedents. To test this hypothesis, we used the Supreme Court 
network of precedents and examined a random sample of sev-
enty-seven decisions rendered by the Warren Court and their ci-
tation rates in the subsequent years of the Warren Court, the 
Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court. This enables a compari-
son of the degree to which Warren Court cases were cited over-
all and among opinions of that Court. 
18. Ruggero J. Aldisert. Precedent: What It Is and What It lsn 't: When Do We Kiss It 
ancl When Do We Kill ft'l, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605.631 (1990). 
19. /d. at 632. 
20. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS. Sllpra note o. at 32-33. 
21. /d.at100tbl.6.1. 
22. /dat117-19. 
23. See ~:enerally, e.g. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS. s11pra note o. 
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The average Rehnquist Court majority opinion citation rate 
for the Warren Court cases in our sample was 0.60 per year. This 
rate ranged from nearly three citations per year for the famous 
opinion in Miranda v. Arizona24 to zero citations for Toalson v. 
New York Yankees, Inc. 25 The extremes of citation illustrate the 
limits of Supreme Court choice in citation selection. The conser-
vative Rehnquist Court presumably did not want to vitalize the 
Miranda decision but accepted cases in which the doctrine could 
not be avoided. However, the Court used these opportunities to 
hedge the implications of the decision. 
Indeed, Miranda provides a useful illustration of the Court's 
use of precedent. Contrary to some expectations, the Rehnquist 
Court rejected the opportunit~ to essentially overrule Miranda 
out of respect for stare decisis. 6 Nevertheless, the Court used its 
opinions, and citations to Miranda, to chip away at the decision's 
significance. The Burger Court initially retained Miranda's basic 
"expansive approach," 27 but began its retrenchment. This accel-
erated in the Rehnquist Court, which was "hostile to Miranda's 
exclusion of reliable evidence. "28 The decision was said to be "si-
lently buried" by the Rehnquist Court. 29 Thus, the high level of 
citations to Miranda in the Rehnquist Court recognized the im-
portance of precedent but simultaneously undermined the power 
of that precedent. 
While Miranda was the most cited of the Warren Court 
cases in our sample, at nearly three citations per year, that rate is 
not truly so high. In the Warren Court, the decision received 
more than ten citations per year after its issuance, and in the 
Burger Court, Miranda received an average of more than seven 
citations per year. Arguably, the Rehnquist Court devitalized 
Miranda, relative to an expected baseline of annualized citations. 
Thus, it appears that the Rehnquist Court gave Miranda fewer 
citations overall and may have used those fewer citations to limit 
its authority. 
The reduction in citation is similar for other prominent 
cases contained in our sample. For New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
24. 3X4 U.S. 436 (1%6). 
25. 346 u.s. 356 (1953). 
26. See Dickerson v. United States. 530 U.S. 42H, 443-44 (2000). 
27. Stephanos Bibas. The Rehnquist Court's Fijih Amendment Incrementalism. 74 
GEO.WASH. L. REV. 107H. 10H1 (2006). 
28. !d. at 1UH4. 
29. Laurence A. Benner. Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Vo!untari-
ness Doctrine in Hislorical Perspective.67 WASH. U. L.Q. 5\J, 163 (1 \JH\J). 
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van,
30 the Warren and Burger Courts gave the opinion five or 
more citations per year, which declined to an average of fewer 
than 1.5 annual citations during the Rehnquist Court. The im-
portant right to counsel ruling of Gideon v. Wainwright31 re-
ceived over eight citations per year in the Warren Court, and 
over five citations per year in the Burger Court, but fewer than 
two citations per year by the Rehnquist Court. 
The raw data suggest a considerable depreciation of vitality 
for Warren Court precedents, including some very important de-
cisions, in the Rehnquist Court. Moreover, the Miranda experi-
ence suggests that even those fewer citations may have been de-
voted to undermining the power of the precedent. Analysis of 
the fate of Warren Court precedents in the Rehnquist Court re-
quires a somewhat more detailed analysis to compare the num-
ber of citations with what might be expected for given cases and 
to try to explain any differences discovered. The following sec-
tion undertakes this analysis. 
III. AGING OF WARREN COURT PRECEDENTS IN 
THE REHNQUIST COURT 
The above section simply presents data on the frequency 
with which the Rehnquist Court cited certain opinions of the 
Warren Court. While this provides some information, one would 
want an "expected value" of such citations before drawing con-
clusions. We noted the possibility that Warren opinions received 
more citations because they were such important cases, and it is 
possible that the Marshall opinions received fewer citations be-
cause they happened to be in relatively unimportant cases. Some 
benchmark expected value is necessary to control for the un-
avoidability feature of citing precedents. Creating such an ex-
pected value of citation, though, requires some benchmark for 
the expectation, and there is no indisputable objective measure 
for a particular opinion's citation frequency. We use Burger 
Court citations to the Warren Court cases as our benchmark, 
which at least provides a comparison of the Rehnquist and Bur-
ger Court eras. 
Before proceeding with this analysis, we need some under-
standing of the effect of age on a precedent's vitality. In other 
citations networks, such as the World Wide Web, the temporal 
30. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
31. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
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factor has no impact in determining the attractivenness of a 
document in getting new citations. In our network analysis of the 
United States Supreme Court, we discovered that time is impor-
tant because cases tend to age. "Aging" means that a document 
progressively looses its ability to attract new citations as its age 
increases. Younger cases tend to be more attractive than very 
old cases. The dynamics of growth of the network is thus led by 
this aging phenomenon. We studied the probability that a legal 
case will get a new citation and we averaged over all cases. This 
average probability is called the "kernel" of the network in net-
work theory language. It provides information on the growth 
mechanism of the network. In most real networks, we find a 
"preferential attachment" mechanism of growth. This means 
that the probability that a document will get a new citation in-
creases with the degree of the document. We found that in the 
United States Supreme Court network, we still have a preferen-
tial attachment mechanism, but we also found that the age of the 
case has an important influence. 
In particular, the increase of the degree of a legal case, 11k, 
is related with a power law function of the age according to the 
following formula: 
L1k =a·" 
where k is the citation to a precedent, a is the age of the prece-
dent, and B is an exponent which depends on the degree of the 
document and which undergoes strong variations in different his-
torical periods. This provides us with an "age-kernel" formula 
for separating the effect of a precedent's age on its future cita-
tions. This reflects, one could say, the depreciation of the capital 
stock of precedent over time. 32 
It is important to note that B is not always negative. It takes 
a certain amount of time for precedents to come into their vital-
ity, and they typically grow in significance over a certain number 
of years. Cases of great age tend on average to have lost their in-
fluence. However, this effect does not occur promptly, and the 
aging/vitality association has varied over time. Figure 1 displays 
the distribution of rate of citation (degree) for the year 2000, 
with the relative age of the precedent on the horizontal axis and 
the cumulative citations it has received on the vertical axis. 
32. See generally Landes & Posner. supra note 2. 
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Figure 1 
Aging of Precedent in 2000 
• AverageAge vs. Degree 
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The fit line for this figure reveals that cumulative citations stead-
ily increased for past precedents up to around fifty years of age. 
At about that time, the citation rate begins to level off to a point 
where much older cases are seldom cited, on average. 
Different courts have relied to greater or lesser degrees on 
older precedents. The relative effect of aging in years from re-
cent decades can be seen in the following summary table, which 
displays the change in B over time. 
Table 1 
Relative Aging of Precedents Over Time 
Year B 
1950 -0.73776 
1960 -0.70922 
1980 -0.80599 
2000 -0.43904 
In 2000, during the Rehnquist Court, aging had relatively less ef-
fect on the probability of a case citation, as the negative magni-
tude of B was much smaller than in recent prior Courts. The 
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Rehnquist Court thus tended to rely more on elderly precedents 
than did the Courts for the earlier comparison decades. 
To ascertain the effect of the Rehnquist Court on the cita-
tion of Warren Court precedents, we calculated the citation pro-
file for each of the cases in our sample. For our benchmark, we 
examined the citation profile for those same cases during the 
Burger Court era. Initially, we compared the probability of a 
Rehnquist Court citation to a particular Warren Court precedent 
with the probability of a Burger Court citation to that precedent 
and found a high correlation of approximately 0.90. This pro-
vides some evidence of the effect of the legal model of decision-
making or the unavoidability of citation to a precedent. The cita-
tion of particular precedents in the two Courts was roughly 
parallel, probably a testimony to their indisputed relevance to 
the cases before the Courts. However, the ten percent variance 
reveals some change in citation patterns that may be of prag-
matic import. In addition, there was only a 0.43 correlation be-
tween the Warren Court's use of its own precedents and the 
Rehnquist Court's use of those precedents. 
This correlation only examines the citations among Warren 
Court precedents, though, and cannot reveal the relative signifi-
cance given to those precedents by the Rehnquist Court. Thus, it 
is possible that the Rehnquist Court reduced the vitality of all 
Warren Court precedents, without altering the relative vitality of 
particular opinions rendered by that Court. To examine the lat-
ter effect, we compared the citation of each of our sample War-
ren Court precedents in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. This 
revealed an average seventy percent reduction in citations to 
Warren Court precedents as compared to their citations in the 
Burger Court. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court citations for the 
cases in our sample were below the comparative expected value 
for seventy-six of the cases and increased for only one.33 This 
demonstrates that the Rehnquist Court significantly decreased 
the vitality of the Warren Court opinions that we studied. 
Some of this effect is certainly attributable to the smaller 
docket of the Rehnquist Court.34 While the Burger Court aver-
33. The exceptional case for which Rehnquist Court citations increased was Hanna 
v. Plumer. 3HO U.S. 460 ( 1'!65). The case was important procedurally in establishing that 
the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure survived Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 
304 U.S. 64 (!93H). and that the Rules. as opposed to conflicting state rules. govern. 
34. One of the most striking features of the Rehnquist Court was its reduction in 
the Court's docket. as compared to the Burger Court. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanic 
Lindquist. The Decisional Significance of 1he Chief .fu.wice. !54 U. PA. L. REV. I 665. 
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aged about 135 majority opinions per term, the Rehnquist court 
dropped this average to around ninety per term. Assuming no 
change in the number of citations per case, one would expect the 
probability of any given case's citation to drop by about thirty-
three percent, due simply to the decreased caseload. So the re-
duced caseload could explain about half of the reduction in vital-
ity of Warren Court decisions. 
The decrease in precedent vitality was not uniform among 
the Warren Court opinions examined. The data showed a slight 
increase in vitality for Hanna and Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul,35 and the most dramatic decrease in vital-
ity for Benton v. Maryland. 36 The depreciation of precedent thus 
varied considerably for different opinions. 
The results for our sample were integrated into the United 
States Supreme Court Database, to permit further analysis of ci-
tation rates. The difference among cases could be explained by a 
tendency of the Rehnquist Court to more frequently cite conser-
vative decisions than liberal ones, but this was not the case. 
There was no difference in citation probability based on the di-
rection of the case outcome. This could be due to a variety of 
reasons including: (a) sincere, nonideological citation, (b) nega-
tive citations to liberal opinions, or (c) the possibility that the di-
rection of the outcome is not a reliable indicator of the degree to 
which the opinion was liberal or conservative. 
Another possible determinant of case citation is the size of 
the majority vote in the precedential case. Perhaps larger majori-
ties carry greater future weight. The Court's occasional desire 
for unanimity in controversial cases suggests that this might be 
so.37 This theory has been undermined by prior empirical analy-
sis,38 though, and was untrue for our cases. There was no differ-
ence in citation probability based on the size of the majority vote 
in the case. 
Our comparative examination of depreciation focuses on 
the authors of the opinions in our sample. The Rehnquist Court 
1oYo (200o) (displaying the reduction in Figure 7). 
35. 373 U.S. 132 (1%3). This decision held that a state law regulating agriculture 
did not offend the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 
36. 31}5 U.S. 7K4 (1Y6Y). This decision found that the double jeopardy bar prevented 
a conviction on a larceny charge after a burglary conviction was set aside. 
37. See Frank B. Cross. The Justices of Strategy. 4H DUKE L.J. 511. 554-57 (1YYH) 
(discussing some of the theory and evidence of this effect). 
38. See generally HANSFORD & SPRIGGS. supra note o. 
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may have cited opinions by certain Warren Court Justices more 
than others, for a variety of possible reasons. Our hypothesis is 
that the Rehnquist Court will be more likely cite cases written by 
Justices with whom the Court has greater ideological affinity, 
e.g., the relatively more conservative Warren Court Justices. To 
test this theory, we took the mean depreciation rate for opinions 
authored by various Justices of the Warren Court. Figure 2 dis-
plays the results. 
Figure 2 
Precedent Depreciation by Warren Court Justice-Author 
Black 
Brennan 
Clark 
Court 
Douglas 
Fortas 
Harlan 
Marshall 
Stewart 
Warren 
White 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 
mean of Depreciation 
There is some differential effect in relative depreciation by 
Justice of the Warren Court. Justice Marshall's opinions suffered 
the greatest depreciation, at a rate over twenty-five percent higher 
than that of Justices Harlan and Clark. Relatively high deprecia-
tion rates were also found for Justices Fortas, Douglas, White, and 
Brennan, as well as for unauthored opinions of the full Warren 
Court. Although our sample size was small, the differences in de-
preciation reached statistical significance for opinions written by 
Warren (less depreciation) and Marshall (more depreciation) and 
were nearly significant for Fortas and Brennan (more deprecia-
tion). The meaning of the difference is not entirely clear-perhaps 
some Justices wrote narrower opinions of lesser future value, de-
16 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:3 
cided less significant cases, or simply wrote poorer, less persuasive 
opinions. The general association with ideology, though, suggests 
that the ideological content of the opinions may have influenced 
their citation rate in the Rehnquist Court. 
The relatively anomalous finding of Figure 2 is the relatively 
low depreciation of decisions authored by Chief Justice Warren, 
who is generally regarded as more liberal than some other Justices 
of the Court, such as Justice Harlan. These Warren opinions were 
presumably very important decisions and hence unavoidable cita-
tions, but that effect should be controlled by the comparison with 
Burger Court citations. This finding may indicate that the actual 
language of the opinions written by Warren was not so liberal as 
commonly perceived. Alternatively, these decisions may have 
been particular targets of negative citations by the Rehnquist 
Court, as illustrated by its limitation of the Warren-authored 
Miranda opinion. Subsequent research with additional data is 
necessary to disaggregate the meaning of this finding. Regardless 
of the reason, it is important to note that Warren opinions were 
also depreciated by the Rehnquist Court, albeit at a lesser rate 
than those of other Justices. 
Some preliminary conclusions may be drawn. First, the 
Rehnquist Court depreciated the capital stock of Warren Court 
decisions. While about half of this might be attributed to its re-
duced caseload, the remaining half must be explained by some 
more case-specific choice, whether in opinion writing or case se-
lection. Second, this depreciation varied by opinion author, and it 
appears that the Rehnquist Court had greater disfavor for prece-
dents written by particular Justices of the Warren Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Empirical analysis of the legal content of opinions, such as ci-
tation of precedents, is the next important frontier for quantitative 
empirical legal research. Such research has only just begun, with 
analyses such as The Politics of Precedent and other research cited 
above. 39 We offer an advance in these analyses in the Rehnquist 
Court's treatment of prior precedents and hope to stimulate fur-
ther research in the area. 
Our most important findings are on the overall depreciation 
of the overall Warren Court precedents in the Rehnquist Court, 
39. See supra notes JS-23. 27-29. and accompanying text. 
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which are consistent with our earlier findings on the effect of the 
Rehnquist Court on the network of Supreme Court precedents. 
This is explained in part, but not entirely, by the Rehnquist 
Court's smaller docket. Earlier research demonstrates the sig-
nificance of a precedent's vitality on future decisions, so that the 
Rehnquist Court apparently depreciated the importance of these 
decisions. The discovery of an association between citations and 
opinion authors is an intriguing one but not yet conclusive and 
would benefit from replication with a different set of Warren 
Court opinions. In addition, much additional research remains 
on these issues, such as the relative negative treatment of various 
precedents. 
